16 February 2013

Pet Generals or Warriors?

Americans expect our Generals to be aggressive, especially in a time of war. We want wildcats not housecats, wolves and not lapdogs. Presidents and other civilian leaders tend to prefer politicians in uniform, they want pets not guard dogs.

Very few Generals (and some Admirals too) in American history have found a way of entering immediately into the collective consciousness in a way that leaves no doubt of their ferocity as warfighters. Men like Grant, Sherman, Patton, Halsey MacArthur, Swartzkopf, Petraeus, McChrystal.

Others have proven their combat competence with less flair and flamboyance, George Washington, Phil Sheridan, Omar Bradley, Dwight Eisenhower all winners, and eventually household names. These were leaders, the kind whose warriors would follow them into Hell itself.

There have always been Generals who succeed more as political animals, leading organizations, developing a sterling reputation, but never evolving that fighting persona. George C Marshall and Colin Powell for example, led the military, in time of war, without . Some Generals, like William Westmoreland are haunted by the perception of failure.

Many Americans misunderstand the role of the Joint Chiefs.  They are NOT combat leaders.  They are the policy and administrative commanders of their respective services.  They ensure that the men and women under them are trained and led, and prepared to fight. They also serve as the senior military policy board, and the second senior most National Security policy board (second to the National Security Council).  They are led by the Chief and Vice chief, and the Chief serves as the President's Senior military adviser.  They must however, by law allow the Combatant Commanders (like Centcom) fight our wars.

There policy and advisory role, however is important to our military and to our nations.  Today these chiefs are a mixed bag in terms of Combat Leadership. A few of them Like Martin Dempsey and Ray Odierno have served as Generals in Combat. Some like National Guard Bureau Chief, have never seen combat. They have all shown the talent it takes to gain promotion to their services senior ranks.

The last decade, plus, of strife and combat has produced some Genuine American Hero type Generals, men with a reputation for taking it to the enemy. Petraeus, and McChrystal, along with General John Allen were perceived as warfighters, but have all been troubled by scandal, not for the first time in our history. Marine General James Mattis, and Navy Seal Admiral Bill McRaven heading Centcom and USSOCOM respectively, seem today to be the only real wildcats left in the fight, and it's probably best that they have the two key combatant commands in our current conflict.

Our current Joint Chiefs are largely a collection of house cats or lapdogs. Even the Commandant of The Marines Corps, a job held in esteem by active duty and prior service Marines, as THE Guardian of America's warrior traditions, ethos, and standards, is currently an Aviator. Sure USMC Aviators, like all Marines are grunts first, but isn't there a subtle signal sent when the Marines' Commandant, and representative at the highest levels of government spent his career supporting rather than executing the USMC's core competence of Amphibious Infantry operations?

The Chief of Naval Operations is a Submariner. The Air Force Chief spent the better part of the post 9/11 era in bureaucratic jobs, at The CIA and at training units. When he returned to a warfighting command it was in Europe, not exactly the current hotspot of conflict. National Guard Bureau Chief, Frank Grass served as an Army Engineer, as both a National Guard Officer and a civilian in the Army Corps of Engineers. In spite of an operational tempo that has seen hundreds of thousands of National Guard Soldiers and Airmen deployed to combat General Grass has not served overseas in combat.

The JCS, Chairman Army General Martin Dempsey, may at first glance seem like more of a war dog. He commanded the 1
st Armored Division during a prolonged and heated 13 month deployment to Baghdad in 2003-2004 where his division fought and tactically defeated Muqtada Sadr's Mahdi's Army. After promotion to deputy commander at Centcom, he was allowed to act as Centcom commander when Admiral William Fallon retired from that role. However after only six months under Dempsey, command at Centcom went to Dave Petraeus, and Demspsey was hustled off to head the Army's Training and Doctrine Command. Not exactly an endorsement of his warfighting.

General Odierno the Army's chief of Staff is the one semi-exception.  A division commander in Iraq as well, he is known, in the Army as a hard charging military leader.  More of a Bradley than a Patton, he still holds the respect of his soldiers unlike his immediate predecessors, (including Dempsey who he seems to overshadow during joint public appearances).

Look, it takes an enormous amount of education, dedication, competence and other traits to make to even a one star position in the US Military, there is no doubt that all of our Joint Chiefs, like all the men and women they lead are capable and dedicated public servants, who deserve our respect. One does wonder though why during a time of war, maybe one of our military's top brass has a reputation for killer instinct.

The internal politics, within each service, between them, with the civilians at DOD and at the White House, that determine who is on the JCS are complicated, and hardly transparent. Two things, however are clear. It is certainly is politics that determines who is at that table, and who sits at its head. The politics begin start at those officers careers, in service academies, ROTC programs, and their earliest commands. The second thing: the politics for JCS end at the White House.

The Joint Chiefs serve at the pleasure of the President. They may be recommended by current leaders, and they need to be confirmed by the Senate, but they are nominated by the president. Thus in his role as Commander in Chief the POTUS chooses the men who act as Service Chiefs and as his senior military policy advisers. If we ask why the JCS seem more like lapdogs than war-dogs? The answer is simply that President Obama prefers lapdogs.

04 February 2013

Debt, Deficits, and Defense Dollars, what about Strategy?

Our strategy starts by recognizing that our strength and influence abroad begins with steps we take at home. We must grow our economy and reduce our deficit.”

“We must also build and integrate the capabilities that advance our interests and the interests we share with other countries and peoples. Our Armed Forces will always be a cornerstone of our security...”

These statements appear in the opening paragraphs to the National Security Strategy of the United States of 2010. They are in the introduction, signed by Barack Obama himself, they are echoed in language throughout the rest of that document. The National Security Strategy is a document that is periodically rewritten by the executive branch which outlines the major national security concerns of the United States and how the administration plans to deal with them. These sentences are underscored by additional, similar statements within the document. President Obama and his administration have made it their unequivocal and official position that deficit reduction and military preparedness are keys to America's security. 
 
You wouldn't know it from the administration's words and actions since then. From last year's Debt Ceiling Crisis, to the most recent Fiscal Cliff deal, the President has demonstrated a lack of commitment to deficit reduction, debt relief, or serious defense reform. Not that Congressional Republicans have performed much better. Their negotiations have resulted in a continuing series of “Punts” that have postponed any real discussions on these issues.

America's strength has for decades rested on two integrated pillars, our economy and our military. Economic strength and growth ensured that our military maintained technological and training advantages over diverse threats ranging from the old Soviet Union, to today's International Islamist movement. Our military meanwhile, secured free seas and open trade, and ensured that our economy could grow and remain strong.

Long term economic trends in America today are undermining these pillars. Continued deficit spending has swelled our national debt to sixteen trillion dollars. That's roughly one fifth of the Global Economy. Servicing our debt now costs us roughly 250 Billion dollars a year, an amount that will grow with deficit spending. Our defense budget gobbles up another 900 billion annually. But these two numbers still don't account for the 1.27 trillion in deficit spending. 

A serious, and truly “balanced approach needs to be implemented. Continuing to raise the debt ceiling will only increase our interest payments. Serious spending cuts need to be implemented, and yes there is surely some fat to be cut from defense. Cutting the entire DOD budget, and nothing else though, would still leave us 400 billion in the red annually. While we need to reform defense spending, by analyzing threats and focusing on core capabilities to defeat those threats, and by reforming the acquisition processes that have wasted defense dollars since the 1950s, we also need to reform our entire national budgetary process.

March 1, looms as the next cliffhanger date, by which time defense spending must be addressed, or automatic “sequestration” cuts will proceed. More likely, Congress will act, by punting again. We will postpone any real discussion. Meanwhile the President will continue to dodge on spending reform outside the Pentagon. His selection of former Republican Senator Chuck Hagel as Secretary of Defense hints at a preference for deep cuts to the Pentagon's budget. In Congress, Republicans having caved on the Fiscal Cliff, and seem set in the Senate to cave on Hagel's appointment.
So the “who” and the “how” stand as open questions regarding our National Security Strategy. 

President Obama, in contradiction to his own written strategy appears unwilling to reduce spending anywhere but the defense budget. This will undermine our economic strength, erode our military power and weaken our security in the world today. Who will ensure that we reduce our debt, reduce our deficit, ensure continued military advantage? More importantly perhaps: how can we achieve this in the face of leadership that ignores its own strategy?